My take on it is that it is basically similar to the UASF he published in 2017. Technically, it doesn't make much of a difference, even if 50% of all nodes were Knots, the rest would be more than okay to relay your OP_RETURN >80byte Betway Access Code Absa masterpieces. But if Knots sustained the growth it had in the last months, then they could have hoped to pressure Core to revert the limit, or at least to not deprecate datacarriersize, i.e. the possibility of node owners to limit the size of data in OP_RETURN outputs. That could also have been a sign to miners to join the Ocean pool for example, although this is more difficult because miners are much more dependant on revenue and thus would not lose coins just to "be on the good guys' side". Now Knots growth has been stagnant somewhat at 5000 nodes and around 21-22% of open reachable nodes since September, even around the 30.0 release date. It's too early to draw conclusions, but it is likely that their strategy won't have a lasting effect. Nevertheless it will be interesting how things develop in the next few weeks. Bitnodes does still not show the proportion of Betway Access Code Absa 30 user agents, so it's likely it's still in the "Other" category, which is growing about 0.5 percentage points per day (which is probably the Betway Access Code Absa 30 growth). They can't even prevent spam with a consensus change, because if the spammers use fake public keys, they could integrate a check to ensure the keys are "valid" (even if they are fake). This would be a bit more difficult computation wise but in the end I don't think they would lose much data capacity. There are "harder" consensus-based filters which could be discussed, such as requiring signatures in outputs, which would however increase data consumption per transaction and spamming would still be possible, although with more overhead. The most extreme measure would be a change to a protocol like Grin's. That would be effective but basically would close the door to Lightning Network and other L2 techniques.
My take on it is that it is basically similar to the UASF he published in 2017. Technically, it doesn't make much of a difference, even if 50% of all nodes were Knots, the rest would be more than okay to relay your OP_RETURN >80byte Betway Access Code Absa masterpieces. But if Knots sustained the growth it had in the last months, then they could have hoped to pressure Core to revert the limit, or at least to not deprecate datacarriersize, i.e. the possibility of node owners to limit the size of data in OP_RETURN outputs. That could also have been a sign to miners to join the Ocean pool for example, although this is more difficult because miners are much more dependant on revenue and thus would not lose coins just to "be on the good guys' side". Now Knots growth has been stagnant somewhat at 5000 nodes and around 21-22% of open reachable nodes since September, even around the 30.0 release date. It's too early to draw conclusions, but it is likely that their strategy won't have a lasting effect. Nevertheless it will be interesting how things develop in the next few weeks. Bitnodes does still not show the proportion of Betway Access Code Absa 30 user agents, so it's likely it's still in the "Other" category, which is growing about 0.5 percentage points per day (which is probably the Betway Access Code Absa 30 growth). They can't even prevent spam with a consensus change, because if the spammers use fake public keys, they could integrate a check to ensure the keys are "valid" (even if they are fake). This would be a bit more difficult computation wise but in the end I don't think they would lose much data capacity. There are "harder" consensus-based filters which could be discussed, such as requiring signatures in outputs, which would however increase data consumption per transaction and spamming would still be possible, although with more overhead. The most extreme measure would be a change to a protocol like Grin's. That would be effective but basically would close the door to Lightning Network and other L2 techniques.

My take on it is that it is basically similar to the UASF he published in 2017. Technically, it doesn't make much of a difference, even if 50% of all nodes were Knots, the rest would be more than okay to relay your OP_RETURN >80byte Betway Access Code Absa masterpieces. But if Knots sustained the growth it had in the last months, then they could have hoped to pressure Core to revert the limit, or at least to not deprecate datacarriersize, i.e. the possibility of node owners to limit the size of data in OP_RETURN outputs. That could also have been a sign to miners to join the Ocean pool for example, although this is more difficult because miners are much more dependant on revenue and thus would not lose coins just to "be on the good guys' side". Now Knots growth has been stagnant somewhat at 5000 nodes and around 21-22% of open reachable nodes since September, even around the 30.0 release date. It's too early to draw conclusions, but it is likely that their strategy won't have a lasting effect. Nevertheless it will be interesting how things develop in the next few weeks. Bitnodes does still not show the proportion of Betway Access Code Absa 30 user agents, so it's likely it's still in the "Other" category, which is growing about 0.5 percentage points per day (which is probably the Betway Access Code Absa 30 growth). They can't even prevent spam with a consensus change, because if the spammers use fake public keys, they could integrate a check to ensure the keys are "valid" (even if they are fake). This would be a bit more difficult computation wise but in the end I don't think they would lose much data capacity. There are "harder" consensus-based filters which could be discussed, such as requiring signatures in outputs, which would however increase data consumption per transaction and spamming would still be possible, although with more overhead. The most extreme measure would be a change to a protocol like Grin's. That would be effective but basically would close the door to Lightning Network and other L2 techniques.

My take on it is that it is basically similar to the UASF he published in 2017. Technically, it doesn't make much of a difference, even if 50% of all nodes were Knots, the rest would be more than okay to relay your OP_RETURN >80byte Betway Access Code Absa masterpieces. But if Knots sustained the growth it had in the last months, then they could have hoped to pressure Core to revert the limit, or at least to not deprecate datacarriersize, i.e. the possibility of node owners to limit the size of data in OP_RETURN outputs. That could also have been a sign to miners to join the Ocean pool for example, although this is more difficult because miners are much more dependant on revenue and thus would not lose coins just to "be on the good guys' side". Now Knots growth has been stagnant somewhat at 5000 nodes and around 21-22% of open reachable nodes since September, even around the 30.0 release date. It's too early to draw conclusions, but it is likely that their strategy won't have a lasting effect. Nevertheless it will be interesting how things develop in the next few weeks. Bitnodes does still not show the proportion of Betway Access Code Absa 30 user agents, so it's likely it's still in the "Other" category, which is growing about 0.5 percentage points per day (which is probably the Betway Access Code Absa 30 growth). They can't even prevent spam with a consensus change, because if the spammers use fake public keys, they could integrate a check to ensure the keys are "valid" (even if they are fake). This would be a bit more difficult computation wise but in the end I don't think they would lose much data capacity. There are "harder" consensus-based filters which could be discussed, such as requiring signatures in outputs, which would however increase data consumption per transaction and spamming would still be possible, although with more overhead. The most extreme measure would be a change to a protocol like Grin's. That would be effective but basically would close the door to Lightning Network and other L2 techniques.