The old-state attack would work if you get cut-off from all internet past the timeout, but that's no different than with HTLC lightning. The difference however is that in HTLC lightning if the victim closes successfully, the scammer gets punished, in eltoo he only loses transaction fees. This is the incentive problem I mean, the scammer can even try flooding blocks with transactions himself to prevent the victims from closing successfully. One dis-incentive I can imagine is that in the case of the attack being successful, and e.g. there are 3000 from 10000 closing transactions from victims which didn't make it into the blocks before the timeout, it is likely that these 3000 will be those with the least profit for the scammer, because victims with a high level of damage would be willing to pay higher transaction fees. This would be valid both for HTLC-Lightning and Eltoo. But is this enough? I think we might be forgetting why the penalty exists in Poon-Dryja lightning in the first place If penalty did not exist in the current lightning protocol, a simple griefing attack would be: 1. Alice and Mallory have a channel2. Mallory closes with an old state3. Alice closes with newest state to ovverride4. Malloy closes with the exact same old state5. Repeat until no-one is willing to spend yet more money in onchain fees eltoo's sequence numbers make the above attack impossible. The penalty branch in the Poon-Dryja lightning protocol was the only way to stop that attack, I don't think it's meant as a way of stopping the "Mallory closed with an old state and DDOSed my connection all over the world until her old-state channel-close reached timeout" attack, which is what you seem to be thinking (correct me if I'm wrong)
The old-state attack would work if you get cut-off from all internet past the timeout, but that's no different than with HTLC lightning. The difference however is that in HTLC lightning if the victim closes successfully, the scammer gets punished, in eltoo he only loses transaction fees. This is the incentive problem I mean, the scammer can even try flooding blocks with transactions himself to prevent the victims from closing successfully. One dis-incentive I can imagine is that in the case of the attack being successful, and e.g. there are 3000 from 10000 closing transactions from victims which didn't make it into the blocks before the timeout, it is likely that these 3000 will be those with the least profit for the scammer, because victims with a high level of damage would be willing to pay higher transaction fees. This would be valid both for HTLC-Lightning and Eltoo. But is this enough? I think we might be forgetting why the penalty exists in Poon-Dryja lightning in the first place If penalty did not exist in the current lightning protocol, a simple griefing attack would be: 1. Alice and Mallory have a channel2. Mallory closes with an old state3. Alice closes with newest state to ovverride4. Malloy closes with the exact same old state5. Repeat until no-one is willing to spend yet more money in onchain fees eltoo's sequence numbers make the above attack impossible. The penalty branch in the Poon-Dryja lightning protocol was the only way to stop that attack, I don't think it's meant as a way of stopping the "Mallory closed with an old state and DDOSed my connection all over the world until her old-state channel-close reached timeout" attack, which is what you seem to be thinking (correct me if I'm wrong)

The old-state attack would work if you get cut-off from all internet past the timeout, but that's no different than with HTLC lightning. The difference however is that in HTLC lightning if the victim closes successfully, the scammer gets punished, in eltoo he only loses transaction fees. This is the incentive problem I mean, the scammer can even try flooding blocks with transactions himself to prevent the victims from closing successfully. One dis-incentive I can imagine is that in the case of the attack being successful, and e.g. there are 3000 from 10000 closing transactions from victims which didn't make it into the blocks before the timeout, it is likely that these 3000 will be those with the least profit for the scammer, because victims with a high level of damage would be willing to pay higher transaction fees. This would be valid both for HTLC-Lightning and Eltoo. But is this enough? I think we might be forgetting why the penalty exists in Poon-Dryja lightning in the first place If penalty did not exist in the current lightning protocol, a simple griefing attack would be: 1. Alice and Mallory have a channel2. Mallory closes with an old state3. Alice closes with newest state to ovverride4. Malloy closes with the exact same old state5. Repeat until no-one is willing to spend yet more money in onchain fees eltoo's sequence numbers make the above attack impossible. The penalty branch in the Poon-Dryja lightning protocol was the only way to stop that attack, I don't think it's meant as a way of stopping the "Mallory closed with an old state and DDOSed my connection all over the world until her old-state channel-close reached timeout" attack, which is what you seem to be thinking (correct me if I'm wrong)

The old-state attack would work if you get cut-off from all internet past the timeout, but that's no different than with HTLC lightning. The difference however is that in HTLC lightning if the victim closes successfully, the scammer gets punished, in eltoo he only loses transaction fees. This is the incentive problem I mean, the scammer can even try flooding blocks with transactions himself to prevent the victims from closing successfully. One dis-incentive I can imagine is that in the case of the attack being successful, and e.g. there are 3000 from 10000 closing transactions from victims which didn't make it into the blocks before the timeout, it is likely that these 3000 will be those with the least profit for the scammer, because victims with a high level of damage would be willing to pay higher transaction fees. This would be valid both for HTLC-Lightning and Eltoo. But is this enough? I think we might be forgetting why the penalty exists in Poon-Dryja lightning in the first place If penalty did not exist in the current lightning protocol, a simple griefing attack would be: 1. Alice and Mallory have a channel2. Mallory closes with an old state3. Alice closes with newest state to ovverride4. Malloy closes with the exact same old state5. Repeat until no-one is willing to spend yet more money in onchain fees eltoo's sequence numbers make the above attack impossible. The penalty branch in the Poon-Dryja lightning protocol was the only way to stop that attack, I don't think it's meant as a way of stopping the "Mallory closed with an old state and DDOSed my connection all over the world until her old-state channel-close reached timeout" attack, which is what you seem to be thinking (correct me if I'm wrong)