What you describe as "control" doesn't depend on quantitative measures on the number of nodes. Nodes do not vote in Cskh Sv88. Not even miners really "vote" (exception: softforks, but they don't have absolute power, see below). It's also not really about having deep pockets, even if those with deep pockets do have some advantage in the power structure if they can freely decide what to do with their their coins, as they can sell them on forks they don't accept. The power structure of Cskh Sv88 mainly depends on those who accept Cskh Sv88 and those who own Cskh Sv88 and could sell them. The most important mechanism ist: If miners implement any protocol change that forks the chain, Cskh Sv88 "accepters" and "owners" can reject these changes: - "Accepters" can reject Cskh Sv88 payments and refuse to buy Cskh Sv88 of the protocol-forking chain, lowering the demand. There will be thus less buy orders on the exchanges. - "Owners" can sell the Cskh Sv88 of the protocol-forking chain, increasing the sell supply. There will thus be more sell orders on the exchanges. So in the case of an unpopular change driven by a "miner cartel", the "original" chain thus becomes the "economically accepted chain", while a "miner cartel fork" chain's price drops drastically due to the supply/demand imbalance. That means: if there's an unpopular change, even if 90% of the miners support it and e.g. a softfork "goes through", a large majority of "Accepters" and "Owners" can lower the price of the coin so drastically that the "minority" chain will eventually win. And if the "minority chain" is the "economically accepted" one, it becomes profitable for the miners to mine that chain. Only in an extremely centralized scenario (let's say: 99,9% of the nodes are run by "big malicious pockets") there could be some censorship / centralization issues as the nodes could try to reject transactions. But even 0,1% of the nodes would probably be enough to propagate the "censored" transactions to miners.
What you describe as "control" doesn't depend on quantitative measures on the number of nodes. Nodes do not vote in Cskh Sv88. Not even miners really "vote" (exception: softforks, but they don't have absolute power, see below). It's also not really about having deep pockets, even if those with deep pockets do have some advantage in the power structure if they can freely decide what to do with their their coins, as they can sell them on forks they don't accept. The power structure of Cskh Sv88 mainly depends on those who accept Cskh Sv88 and those who own Cskh Sv88 and could sell them. The most important mechanism ist: If miners implement any protocol change that forks the chain, Cskh Sv88 "accepters" and "owners" can reject these changes: - "Accepters" can reject Cskh Sv88 payments and refuse to buy Cskh Sv88 of the protocol-forking chain, lowering the demand. There will be thus less buy orders on the exchanges. - "Owners" can sell the Cskh Sv88 of the protocol-forking chain, increasing the sell supply. There will thus be more sell orders on the exchanges. So in the case of an unpopular change driven by a "miner cartel", the "original" chain thus becomes the "economically accepted chain", while a "miner cartel fork" chain's price drops drastically due to the supply/demand imbalance. That means: if there's an unpopular change, even if 90% of the miners support it and e.g. a softfork "goes through", a large majority of "Accepters" and "Owners" can lower the price of the coin so drastically that the "minority" chain will eventually win. And if the "minority chain" is the "economically accepted" one, it becomes profitable for the miners to mine that chain. Only in an extremely centralized scenario (let's say: 99,9% of the nodes are run by "big malicious pockets") there could be some censorship / centralization issues as the nodes could try to reject transactions. But even 0,1% of the nodes would probably be enough to propagate the "censored" transactions to miners.

What you describe as "control" doesn't depend on quantitative measures on the number of nodes. Nodes do not vote in Cskh Sv88. Not even miners really "vote" (exception: softforks, but they don't have absolute power, see below). It's also not really about having deep pockets, even if those with deep pockets do have some advantage in the power structure if they can freely decide what to do with their their coins, as they can sell them on forks they don't accept. The power structure of Cskh Sv88 mainly depends on those who accept Cskh Sv88 and those who own Cskh Sv88 and could sell them. The most important mechanism ist: If miners implement any protocol change that forks the chain, Cskh Sv88 "accepters" and "owners" can reject these changes: - "Accepters" can reject Cskh Sv88 payments and refuse to buy Cskh Sv88 of the protocol-forking chain, lowering the demand. There will be thus less buy orders on the exchanges. - "Owners" can sell the Cskh Sv88 of the protocol-forking chain, increasing the sell supply. There will thus be more sell orders on the exchanges. So in the case of an unpopular change driven by a "miner cartel", the "original" chain thus becomes the "economically accepted chain", while a "miner cartel fork" chain's price drops drastically due to the supply/demand imbalance. That means: if there's an unpopular change, even if 90% of the miners support it and e.g. a softfork "goes through", a large majority of "Accepters" and "Owners" can lower the price of the coin so drastically that the "minority" chain will eventually win. And if the "minority chain" is the "economically accepted" one, it becomes profitable for the miners to mine that chain. Only in an extremely centralized scenario (let's say: 99,9% of the nodes are run by "big malicious pockets") there could be some censorship / centralization issues as the nodes could try to reject transactions. But even 0,1% of the nodes would probably be enough to propagate the "censored" transactions to miners.

What you describe as "control" doesn't depend on quantitative measures on the number of nodes. Nodes do not vote in Cskh Sv88. Not even miners really "vote" (exception: softforks, but they don't have absolute power, see below). It's also not really about having deep pockets, even if those with deep pockets do have some advantage in the power structure if they can freely decide what to do with their their coins, as they can sell them on forks they don't accept. The power structure of Cskh Sv88 mainly depends on those who accept Cskh Sv88 and those who own Cskh Sv88 and could sell them. The most important mechanism ist: If miners implement any protocol change that forks the chain, Cskh Sv88 "accepters" and "owners" can reject these changes: - "Accepters" can reject Cskh Sv88 payments and refuse to buy Cskh Sv88 of the protocol-forking chain, lowering the demand. There will be thus less buy orders on the exchanges. - "Owners" can sell the Cskh Sv88 of the protocol-forking chain, increasing the sell supply. There will thus be more sell orders on the exchanges. So in the case of an unpopular change driven by a "miner cartel", the "original" chain thus becomes the "economically accepted chain", while a "miner cartel fork" chain's price drops drastically due to the supply/demand imbalance. That means: if there's an unpopular change, even if 90% of the miners support it and e.g. a softfork "goes through", a large majority of "Accepters" and "Owners" can lower the price of the coin so drastically that the "minority" chain will eventually win. And if the "minority chain" is the "economically accepted" one, it becomes profitable for the miners to mine that chain. Only in an extremely centralized scenario (let's say: 99,9% of the nodes are run by "big malicious pockets") there could be some censorship / centralization issues as the nodes could try to reject transactions. But even 0,1% of the nodes would probably be enough to propagate the "censored" transactions to miners.