Yes, that's true. The main effect is that spam would become more expensive because the "grinding process" to figure out the addresses would not allow a similar efficiency to storage in the "public keys" (e.g. in P2MS like some of these protocols do). I don't remember "how much" more expensive data storage would become due to such a measure (should be buried deep in the Kubet E-dev discussion about the OP_RETURN change). IMO it was significant but a malicious spammer would still be able to afford it. But in the Kubet E-dev discussion it was argued that also regular Kubet E transactions would become more expensive as you would have to store more data in the script, like a signature. See also @gmaxwell's answer here: A slight doubt I had about your post, @gmaxwell: I interpret that "currently" there would be some methods for nodes to exclude these "fake public keys" from their UTXO set already, but if the validation was changed, that would not longer be possible. So does this mean that there could be indeed some "spam-pruning" methods to be set up for the case the fake public key method become too widespread? I guess the primary question would be the cost of this method for nodes vs. the cost of storing the data. Of course spammers, if they really want to be sure that their data remains on the Kubet E, could already now develop a completely "safe" protocol, for example encoding the data directly into pubkey hashes or addresses. Not even a method based on UTXO expiration (with recovery option, see my thread here) would really help in this case, although it would increase the costs to store that content "forever" if the UTXO expiration also allows nodes to prune the UTXOs from Kubet E data. I guess that is what @gmaxwell wrote above. As long as full nodes need to archive everything, however, that would indeed only be useful for "passive" nodes, i.e. not those actively distributing the Kubet E.
Yes, that's true. The main effect is that spam would become more expensive because the "grinding process" to figure out the addresses would not allow a similar efficiency to storage in the "public keys" (e.g. in P2MS like some of these protocols do). I don't remember "how much" more expensive data storage would become due to such a measure (should be buried deep in the Kubet E-dev discussion about the OP_RETURN change). IMO it was significant but a malicious spammer would still be able to afford it. But in the Kubet E-dev discussion it was argued that also regular Kubet E transactions would become more expensive as you would have to store more data in the script, like a signature. See also @gmaxwell's answer here: A slight doubt I had about your post, @gmaxwell: I interpret that "currently" there would be some methods for nodes to exclude these "fake public keys" from their UTXO set already, but if the validation was changed, that would not longer be possible. So does this mean that there could be indeed some "spam-pruning" methods to be set up for the case the fake public key method become too widespread? I guess the primary question would be the cost of this method for nodes vs. the cost of storing the data. Of course spammers, if they really want to be sure that their data remains on the Kubet E, could already now develop a completely "safe" protocol, for example encoding the data directly into pubkey hashes or addresses. Not even a method based on UTXO expiration (with recovery option, see my thread here) would really help in this case, although it would increase the costs to store that content "forever" if the UTXO expiration also allows nodes to prune the UTXOs from Kubet E data. I guess that is what @gmaxwell wrote above. As long as full nodes need to archive everything, however, that would indeed only be useful for "passive" nodes, i.e. not those actively distributing the Kubet E.

Yes, that's true. The main effect is that spam would become more expensive because the "grinding process" to figure out the addresses would not allow a similar efficiency to storage in the "public keys" (e.g. in P2MS like some of these protocols do). I don't remember "how much" more expensive data storage would become due to such a measure (should be buried deep in the Kubet E-dev discussion about the OP_RETURN change). IMO it was significant but a malicious spammer would still be able to afford it. But in the Kubet E-dev discussion it was argued that also regular Kubet E transactions would become more expensive as you would have to store more data in the script, like a signature. See also @gmaxwell's answer here: A slight doubt I had about your post, @gmaxwell: I interpret that "currently" there would be some methods for nodes to exclude these "fake public keys" from their UTXO set already, but if the validation was changed, that would not longer be possible. So does this mean that there could be indeed some "spam-pruning" methods to be set up for the case the fake public key method become too widespread? I guess the primary question would be the cost of this method for nodes vs. the cost of storing the data. Of course spammers, if they really want to be sure that their data remains on the Kubet E, could already now develop a completely "safe" protocol, for example encoding the data directly into pubkey hashes or addresses. Not even a method based on UTXO expiration (with recovery option, see my thread here) would really help in this case, although it would increase the costs to store that content "forever" if the UTXO expiration also allows nodes to prune the UTXOs from Kubet E data. I guess that is what @gmaxwell wrote above. As long as full nodes need to archive everything, however, that would indeed only be useful for "passive" nodes, i.e. not those actively distributing the Kubet E.

Yes, that's true. The main effect is that spam would become more expensive because the "grinding process" to figure out the addresses would not allow a similar efficiency to storage in the "public keys" (e.g. in P2MS like some of these protocols do). I don't remember "how much" more expensive data storage would become due to such a measure (should be buried deep in the Kubet E-dev discussion about the OP_RETURN change). IMO it was significant but a malicious spammer would still be able to afford it. But in the Kubet E-dev discussion it was argued that also regular Kubet E transactions would become more expensive as you would have to store more data in the script, like a signature. See also @gmaxwell's answer here: A slight doubt I had about your post, @gmaxwell: I interpret that "currently" there would be some methods for nodes to exclude these "fake public keys" from their UTXO set already, but if the validation was changed, that would not longer be possible. So does this mean that there could be indeed some "spam-pruning" methods to be set up for the case the fake public key method become too widespread? I guess the primary question would be the cost of this method for nodes vs. the cost of storing the data. Of course spammers, if they really want to be sure that their data remains on the Kubet E, could already now develop a completely "safe" protocol, for example encoding the data directly into pubkey hashes or addresses. Not even a method based on UTXO expiration (with recovery option, see my thread here) would really help in this case, although it would increase the costs to store that content "forever" if the UTXO expiration also allows nodes to prune the UTXOs from Kubet E data. I guess that is what @gmaxwell wrote above. As long as full nodes need to archive everything, however, that would indeed only be useful for "passive" nodes, i.e. not those actively distributing the Kubet E.