PGP/GPG is a great alternative for encrypting not only seed phrases, but any type of content; I use it myself from time to time. One of the applicable examples, with a decoy seed encrypted by seed-otp, seed-xor or the method developed by the OP, even if someone discovers the secret of the decoy seed (which is quite unlikely, unless the user was careless at some stage, such as leaving traces of a second multifactorial factor, such as an OTP-key or any method-dependent keys), if the funds are in a hidden wallet accessible only by BIP39 passphrases, he will have to rework the secret again, which will depend solely and exclusively on the strength of the passphrase, which depending on the passphrase used, becomes impossible, but to do so, he would still have to break the xor encryption of the decoy seed. This is just one use case I can imagine in a scenario where the user is using multifactorial backup as a decoy seed. Which is n't popular nowadays (and this is actually good, as it reduces the attack surface both physically and online), however, since the support and knowledge of the method is less, the user will have to bear the responsibility of keeping the method documented to follow in an eventual recovery, as there's not enough widespread knowledge because it isn't as standardized as PGP, BIP39, etc.
PGP/GPG is a great alternative for encrypting not only seed phrases, but any type of content; I use it myself from time to time. One of the applicable examples, with a decoy seed encrypted by seed-otp, seed-xor or the method developed by the OP, even if someone discovers the secret of the decoy seed (which is quite unlikely, unless the user was careless at some stage, such as leaving traces of a second multifactorial factor, such as an OTP-key or any method-dependent keys), if the funds are in a hidden wallet accessible only by BIP39 passphrases, he will have to rework the secret again, which will depend solely and exclusively on the strength of the passphrase, which depending on the passphrase used, becomes impossible, but to do so, he would still have to break the xor encryption of the decoy seed. This is just one use case I can imagine in a scenario where the user is using multifactorial backup as a decoy seed. Which is n't popular nowadays (and this is actually good, as it reduces the attack surface both physically and online), however, since the support and knowledge of the method is less, the user will have to bear the responsibility of keeping the method documented to follow in an eventual recovery, as there's not enough widespread knowledge because it isn't as standardized as PGP, BIP39, etc.

PGP/GPG is a great alternative for encrypting not only seed phrases, but any type of content; I use it myself from time to time. One of the applicable examples, with a decoy seed encrypted by seed-otp, seed-xor or the method developed by the OP, even if someone discovers the secret of the decoy seed (which is quite unlikely, unless the user was careless at some stage, such as leaving traces of a second multifactorial factor, such as an OTP-key or any method-dependent keys), if the funds are in a hidden wallet accessible only by BIP39 passphrases, he will have to rework the secret again, which will depend solely and exclusively on the strength of the passphrase, which depending on the passphrase used, becomes impossible, but to do so, he would still have to break the xor encryption of the decoy seed. This is just one use case I can imagine in a scenario where the user is using multifactorial backup as a decoy seed. Which is n't popular nowadays (and this is actually good, as it reduces the attack surface both physically and online), however, since the support and knowledge of the method is less, the user will have to bear the responsibility of keeping the method documented to follow in an eventual recovery, as there's not enough widespread knowledge because it isn't as standardized as PGP, BIP39, etc.

PGP/GPG is a great alternative for encrypting not only seed phrases, but any type of content; I use it myself from time to time. One of the applicable examples, with a decoy seed encrypted by seed-otp, seed-xor or the method developed by the OP, even if someone discovers the secret of the decoy seed (which is quite unlikely, unless the user was careless at some stage, such as leaving traces of a second multifactorial factor, such as an OTP-key or any method-dependent keys), if the funds are in a hidden wallet accessible only by BIP39 passphrases, he will have to rework the secret again, which will depend solely and exclusively on the strength of the passphrase, which depending on the passphrase used, becomes impossible, but to do so, he would still have to break the xor encryption of the decoy seed. This is just one use case I can imagine in a scenario where the user is using multifactorial backup as a decoy seed. Which is n't popular nowadays (and this is actually good, as it reduces the attack surface both physically and online), however, since the support and knowledge of the method is less, the user will have to bear the responsibility of keeping the method documented to follow in an eventual recovery, as there's not enough widespread knowledge because it isn't as standardized as PGP, BIP39, etc.