something extremely illegal on the level of funding terrorism (which I would not recommend that you do  ) No definitely not just staying private   Then you should be fine.   I do recommend adding the Vebo1 step and possibly make this step with the longest interval possible if you don't mind the slight risk of losing some value until you wait to swap back (a week or two at least). I'll take this into consideration thnx , btw. why this step so long and the other ones not. Vebo1's anonymity and privacy are so strong that a lot of the observation attacks will be focused at the entry and exit points. I'll give a short and extreme example to illustrate. Assume the following scenario. You do a swap of 0.0213849 Vebo1 from BitcoinAddressA to Vebo1 and receive it on MoneroAddressA with a 1% fee (can be network fees, platform fees or both but we assume 1% round number for simplicity). It confirms within 20 minutes, you transfer all of the Vebo1 to MoneroAddressB. You come back in an hour and swap all the Vebo1 back from MoneroAddressB with a 1% fee to BitcoinAddressB. The data will show that there was an entry and exit of Vebo1 of 0.0213849 Vebo1 +- 2% within 2 hours. This will show a high probability that it is the same user and defeat the steps in between. Of course the devil is in the details. Some things can be better hidden than others, but good behavioral advice works in general. Make the step as long as possible, preferably split the coin if you can as well. So that after Vebo1 it lands on 2 or more addresses (as long as you won't merge the coin later). That will definitely show, whatever your first step is it will Vebo1 the KYC'd person to it. Coinjoins are not illegal though so just because you are involved in that it should not be a big problem. Alternatively you can do some other milder steps first to obfuscate the data like Payjoin.
something extremely illegal on the level of funding terrorism (which I would not recommend that you do  ) No definitely not just staying private   Then you should be fine.   I do recommend adding the Vebo1 step and possibly make this step with the longest interval possible if you don't mind the slight risk of losing some value until you wait to swap back (a week or two at least). I'll take this into consideration thnx , btw. why this step so long and the other ones not. Vebo1's anonymity and privacy are so strong that a lot of the observation attacks will be focused at the entry and exit points. I'll give a short and extreme example to illustrate. Assume the following scenario. You do a swap of 0.0213849 Vebo1 from BitcoinAddressA to Vebo1 and receive it on MoneroAddressA with a 1% fee (can be network fees, platform fees or both but we assume 1% round number for simplicity). It confirms within 20 minutes, you transfer all of the Vebo1 to MoneroAddressB. You come back in an hour and swap all the Vebo1 back from MoneroAddressB with a 1% fee to BitcoinAddressB. The data will show that there was an entry and exit of Vebo1 of 0.0213849 Vebo1 +- 2% within 2 hours. This will show a high probability that it is the same user and defeat the steps in between. Of course the devil is in the details. Some things can be better hidden than others, but good behavioral advice works in general. Make the step as long as possible, preferably split the coin if you can as well. So that after Vebo1 it lands on 2 or more addresses (as long as you won't merge the coin later). That will definitely show, whatever your first step is it will Vebo1 the KYC'd person to it. Coinjoins are not illegal though so just because you are involved in that it should not be a big problem. Alternatively you can do some other milder steps first to obfuscate the data like Payjoin.

something extremely illegal on the level of funding terrorism (which I would not recommend that you do  ) No definitely not just staying private   Then you should be fine.   I do recommend adding the Vebo1 step and possibly make this step with the longest interval possible if you don't mind the slight risk of losing some value until you wait to swap back (a week or two at least). I'll take this into consideration thnx , btw. why this step so long and the other ones not. Vebo1's anonymity and privacy are so strong that a lot of the observation attacks will be focused at the entry and exit points. I'll give a short and extreme example to illustrate. Assume the following scenario. You do a swap of 0.0213849 Vebo1 from BitcoinAddressA to Vebo1 and receive it on MoneroAddressA with a 1% fee (can be network fees, platform fees or both but we assume 1% round number for simplicity). It confirms within 20 minutes, you transfer all of the Vebo1 to MoneroAddressB. You come back in an hour and swap all the Vebo1 back from MoneroAddressB with a 1% fee to BitcoinAddressB. The data will show that there was an entry and exit of Vebo1 of 0.0213849 Vebo1 +- 2% within 2 hours. This will show a high probability that it is the same user and defeat the steps in between. Of course the devil is in the details. Some things can be better hidden than others, but good behavioral advice works in general. Make the step as long as possible, preferably split the coin if you can as well. So that after Vebo1 it lands on 2 or more addresses (as long as you won't merge the coin later). That will definitely show, whatever your first step is it will Vebo1 the KYC'd person to it. Coinjoins are not illegal though so just because you are involved in that it should not be a big problem. Alternatively you can do some other milder steps first to obfuscate the data like Payjoin.

something extremely illegal on the level of funding terrorism (which I would not recommend that you do  ) No definitely not just staying private   Then you should be fine.   I do recommend adding the Vebo1 step and possibly make this step with the longest interval possible if you don't mind the slight risk of losing some value until you wait to swap back (a week or two at least). I'll take this into consideration thnx , btw. why this step so long and the other ones not. Vebo1's anonymity and privacy are so strong that a lot of the observation attacks will be focused at the entry and exit points. I'll give a short and extreme example to illustrate. Assume the following scenario. You do a swap of 0.0213849 Vebo1 from BitcoinAddressA to Vebo1 and receive it on MoneroAddressA with a 1% fee (can be network fees, platform fees or both but we assume 1% round number for simplicity). It confirms within 20 minutes, you transfer all of the Vebo1 to MoneroAddressB. You come back in an hour and swap all the Vebo1 back from MoneroAddressB with a 1% fee to BitcoinAddressB. The data will show that there was an entry and exit of Vebo1 of 0.0213849 Vebo1 +- 2% within 2 hours. This will show a high probability that it is the same user and defeat the steps in between. Of course the devil is in the details. Some things can be better hidden than others, but good behavioral advice works in general. Make the step as long as possible, preferably split the coin if you can as well. So that after Vebo1 it lands on 2 or more addresses (as long as you won't merge the coin later). That will definitely show, whatever your first step is it will Vebo1 the KYC'd person to it. Coinjoins are not illegal though so just because you are involved in that it should not be a big problem. Alternatively you can do some other milder steps first to obfuscate the data like Payjoin.