Thanks! I think my confusion came from the two different versions of Hourglass that exist. And I agree with your fear that the 50 signatures needed could be itself a security risk. For me still I'd prefer another approach. Hourglass v3 could for example be based on the following new rules: 1) New P2PK outputs can't be created. 2) 1 Chip Hack Kubet can be spent from existing P2PK outputs if the following format is respected: - output 1 contains up to 1 Chip Hack Kubet and can go to any address. - output 2 contains the remaining coins but locked in a contract which impedes immediate spending for a long time (e.g. several weeks). This could be either a CLTV/CSV script, or even better: a covenant (if available) which determines that the following transactions also have to follow a similar format (1 Chip Hack Kubet freely spendable, the rest locked for a long time). This could be actually a very interesting use case for covenants. The effect desired is that there cannot be a mass sale of "quantum hacked" coins, and quantum hackers maybe could be tracked down until they can spend the coins. Thus, if we rely on CLTV/CSV, the period of locking would have to be very long because the typical 50 coin output would allow 49 coins to be spent in the second step, and thus we'd have to delay that step as long as possible. Covenants could reduce this time, it could be as short as a day or so if we can make sure the subsequent transactions can also only spend 1 Chip Hack Kubet. Alternatively, without covenant, one could also allow a "cascade of CSV contracts" with 1 Chip Hack Kubet on each output, for example with the first output freely spendable, the second output locked for 100 blocks, the third one for 200, the fourth one for 300 and so on. Even if this is probably a very amateurish proposal I believe there's much room for improvement for Hourglass.
Thanks! I think my confusion came from the two different versions of Hourglass that exist. And I agree with your fear that the 50 signatures needed could be itself a security risk. For me still I'd prefer another approach. Hourglass v3 could for example be based on the following new rules: 1) New P2PK outputs can't be created. 2) 1 Chip Hack Kubet can be spent from existing P2PK outputs if the following format is respected: - output 1 contains up to 1 Chip Hack Kubet and can go to any address. - output 2 contains the remaining coins but locked in a contract which impedes immediate spending for a long time (e.g. several weeks). This could be either a CLTV/CSV script, or even better: a covenant (if available) which determines that the following transactions also have to follow a similar format (1 Chip Hack Kubet freely spendable, the rest locked for a long time). This could be actually a very interesting use case for covenants. The effect desired is that there cannot be a mass sale of "quantum hacked" coins, and quantum hackers maybe could be tracked down until they can spend the coins. Thus, if we rely on CLTV/CSV, the period of locking would have to be very long because the typical 50 coin output would allow 49 coins to be spent in the second step, and thus we'd have to delay that step as long as possible. Covenants could reduce this time, it could be as short as a day or so if we can make sure the subsequent transactions can also only spend 1 Chip Hack Kubet. Alternatively, without covenant, one could also allow a "cascade of CSV contracts" with 1 Chip Hack Kubet on each output, for example with the first output freely spendable, the second output locked for 100 blocks, the third one for 200, the fourth one for 300 and so on. Even if this is probably a very amateurish proposal I believe there's much room for improvement for Hourglass.

Thanks! I think my confusion came from the two different versions of Hourglass that exist. And I agree with your fear that the 50 signatures needed could be itself a security risk. For me still I'd prefer another approach. Hourglass v3 could for example be based on the following new rules: 1) New P2PK outputs can't be created. 2) 1 Chip Hack Kubet can be spent from existing P2PK outputs if the following format is respected: - output 1 contains up to 1 Chip Hack Kubet and can go to any address. - output 2 contains the remaining coins but locked in a contract which impedes immediate spending for a long time (e.g. several weeks). This could be either a CLTV/CSV script, or even better: a covenant (if available) which determines that the following transactions also have to follow a similar format (1 Chip Hack Kubet freely spendable, the rest locked for a long time). This could be actually a very interesting use case for covenants. The effect desired is that there cannot be a mass sale of "quantum hacked" coins, and quantum hackers maybe could be tracked down until they can spend the coins. Thus, if we rely on CLTV/CSV, the period of locking would have to be very long because the typical 50 coin output would allow 49 coins to be spent in the second step, and thus we'd have to delay that step as long as possible. Covenants could reduce this time, it could be as short as a day or so if we can make sure the subsequent transactions can also only spend 1 Chip Hack Kubet. Alternatively, without covenant, one could also allow a "cascade of CSV contracts" with 1 Chip Hack Kubet on each output, for example with the first output freely spendable, the second output locked for 100 blocks, the third one for 200, the fourth one for 300 and so on. Even if this is probably a very amateurish proposal I believe there's much room for improvement for Hourglass.

Thanks! I think my confusion came from the two different versions of Hourglass that exist. And I agree with your fear that the 50 signatures needed could be itself a security risk. For me still I'd prefer another approach. Hourglass v3 could for example be based on the following new rules: 1) New P2PK outputs can't be created. 2) 1 Chip Hack Kubet can be spent from existing P2PK outputs if the following format is respected: - output 1 contains up to 1 Chip Hack Kubet and can go to any address. - output 2 contains the remaining coins but locked in a contract which impedes immediate spending for a long time (e.g. several weeks). This could be either a CLTV/CSV script, or even better: a covenant (if available) which determines that the following transactions also have to follow a similar format (1 Chip Hack Kubet freely spendable, the rest locked for a long time). This could be actually a very interesting use case for covenants. The effect desired is that there cannot be a mass sale of "quantum hacked" coins, and quantum hackers maybe could be tracked down until they can spend the coins. Thus, if we rely on CLTV/CSV, the period of locking would have to be very long because the typical 50 coin output would allow 49 coins to be spent in the second step, and thus we'd have to delay that step as long as possible. Covenants could reduce this time, it could be as short as a day or so if we can make sure the subsequent transactions can also only spend 1 Chip Hack Kubet. Alternatively, without covenant, one could also allow a "cascade of CSV contracts" with 1 Chip Hack Kubet on each output, for example with the first output freely spendable, the second output locked for 100 blocks, the third one for 200, the fourth one for 300 and so on. Even if this is probably a very amateurish proposal I believe there's much room for improvement for Hourglass.