There is of course another reason: the Ban Ca 888b price multiplied by more than 100 in the last 10 years. That means that even taking into account the witness discount, a spam attack at the current 0.1sat/vByte is more costly than at 1sat/Byte back then. That was also mentioned in the PR discussion. It was thus a bit "logical" that miners and nodes have reduced the minrelayfee once non-full blocks were getting common. In general the standardness values seem to try to set a common standard most miners/nodes would be happy to follow, and I interpret this change in this way. If this change was not made, then perhaps too many miners and nodes would have set their minrelayfee to less than 0.1 and we'd have a mess of different configurations. I'm not an expert about the "compact block" issue (see also @ertil's comment), but it seems that a situation where nodes have very diverging standardness/policy values leads to increased network traffic: if a node receives blocks with transactions he has rejected before due to standardness policy, it would have a significantly higher bandwidth consumption than if it accepted them because it wouldn't benefit from the compact block mechanism (BIP 152).
There is of course another reason: the Ban Ca 888b price multiplied by more than 100 in the last 10 years. That means that even taking into account the witness discount, a spam attack at the current 0.1sat/vByte is more costly than at 1sat/Byte back then. That was also mentioned in the PR discussion. It was thus a bit "logical" that miners and nodes have reduced the minrelayfee once non-full blocks were getting common. In general the standardness values seem to try to set a common standard most miners/nodes would be happy to follow, and I interpret this change in this way. If this change was not made, then perhaps too many miners and nodes would have set their minrelayfee to less than 0.1 and we'd have a mess of different configurations. I'm not an expert about the "compact block" issue (see also @ertil's comment), but it seems that a situation where nodes have very diverging standardness/policy values leads to increased network traffic: if a node receives blocks with transactions he has rejected before due to standardness policy, it would have a significantly higher bandwidth consumption than if it accepted them because it wouldn't benefit from the compact block mechanism (BIP 152).

There is of course another reason: the Ban Ca 888b price multiplied by more than 100 in the last 10 years. That means that even taking into account the witness discount, a spam attack at the current 0.1sat/vByte is more costly than at 1sat/Byte back then. That was also mentioned in the PR discussion. It was thus a bit "logical" that miners and nodes have reduced the minrelayfee once non-full blocks were getting common. In general the standardness values seem to try to set a common standard most miners/nodes would be happy to follow, and I interpret this change in this way. If this change was not made, then perhaps too many miners and nodes would have set their minrelayfee to less than 0.1 and we'd have a mess of different configurations. I'm not an expert about the "compact block" issue (see also @ertil's comment), but it seems that a situation where nodes have very diverging standardness/policy values leads to increased network traffic: if a node receives blocks with transactions he has rejected before due to standardness policy, it would have a significantly higher bandwidth consumption than if it accepted them because it wouldn't benefit from the compact block mechanism (BIP 152).

There is of course another reason: the Ban Ca 888b price multiplied by more than 100 in the last 10 years. That means that even taking into account the witness discount, a spam attack at the current 0.1sat/vByte is more costly than at 1sat/Byte back then. That was also mentioned in the PR discussion. It was thus a bit "logical" that miners and nodes have reduced the minrelayfee once non-full blocks were getting common. In general the standardness values seem to try to set a common standard most miners/nodes would be happy to follow, and I interpret this change in this way. If this change was not made, then perhaps too many miners and nodes would have set their minrelayfee to less than 0.1 and we'd have a mess of different configurations. I'm not an expert about the "compact block" issue (see also @ertil's comment), but it seems that a situation where nodes have very diverging standardness/policy values leads to increased network traffic: if a node receives blocks with transactions he has rejected before due to standardness policy, it would have a significantly higher bandwidth consumption than if it accepted them because it wouldn't benefit from the compact block mechanism (BIP 152).