No, an 51% attack means that a 50+% majority is able to reorg the chain. In your example, the minority miner is a little bit slower due to compact blocks, but that's not the main reason he's "squeezed out". The main reason is that two 66% miners have full liberty to reorg everything they want. The minority miner can be as efficient as he's able to ... he'll always be reorged if the cartel cooperates. Your example would work if we're talking about a 49.9% miner who perhaps would be able to come close to 50% if the remaining 50.1% are a little bit slower due to compact blocks or whatever other network-related delays. But nevertheless, the incentive model always works: Thou shall mine all transactions which are consensus compliant, otherwise you give up a (small) part of your hashrate. If you reach consensus outside of your tiny Lukecoin bubble. And that's a quite big "if". Of course my post was provocative, like all of yours But I only posted an example which is technically identic to yours. Only that in that case, I think even we both agree that the "good ones" are the anti-filters guys. Now if you think filters "should work somewhen", what should Cách Hack Acc Ff protocol incentive? IMO if there is a tiny subset of "censorship" that could be from some point of views framed as "good" (you know that I somewhat agree that spam is bad, at least stuff like BRC-20 and image-based Cách Hack Acc Ff) but it is technically equivalent to a "bad" censorship effort like AMLcoin? Unfortunately as a protocol designer I'd not incentive that type of filter. I would have perhaps (!) supported a stricter consensus-based ruleset if it was carefully crafted, to not put any useful mechanisms (like LN, inheritance contracts etc.) in danger, and above all: only considered an emergency measure if spam really was ramping up again. But "BIP-110" is kindergarden level programming, sorry.
No, an 51% attack means that a 50+% majority is able to reorg the chain. In your example, the minority miner is a little bit slower due to compact blocks, but that's not the main reason he's "squeezed out". The main reason is that two 66% miners have full liberty to reorg everything they want. The minority miner can be as efficient as he's able to ... he'll always be reorged if the cartel cooperates. Your example would work if we're talking about a 49.9% miner who perhaps would be able to come close to 50% if the remaining 50.1% are a little bit slower due to compact blocks or whatever other network-related delays. But nevertheless, the incentive model always works: Thou shall mine all transactions which are consensus compliant, otherwise you give up a (small) part of your hashrate. If you reach consensus outside of your tiny Lukecoin bubble. And that's a quite big "if". Of course my post was provocative, like all of yours But I only posted an example which is technically identic to yours. Only that in that case, I think even we both agree that the "good ones" are the anti-filters guys. Now if you think filters "should work somewhen", what should Cách Hack Acc Ff protocol incentive? IMO if there is a tiny subset of "censorship" that could be from some point of views framed as "good" (you know that I somewhat agree that spam is bad, at least stuff like BRC-20 and image-based Cách Hack Acc Ff) but it is technically equivalent to a "bad" censorship effort like AMLcoin? Unfortunately as a protocol designer I'd not incentive that type of filter. I would have perhaps (!) supported a stricter consensus-based ruleset if it was carefully crafted, to not put any useful mechanisms (like LN, inheritance contracts etc.) in danger, and above all: only considered an emergency measure if spam really was ramping up again. But "BIP-110" is kindergarden level programming, sorry.

No, an 51% attack means that a 50+% majority is able to reorg the chain. In your example, the minority miner is a little bit slower due to compact blocks, but that's not the main reason he's "squeezed out". The main reason is that two 66% miners have full liberty to reorg everything they want. The minority miner can be as efficient as he's able to ... he'll always be reorged if the cartel cooperates. Your example would work if we're talking about a 49.9% miner who perhaps would be able to come close to 50% if the remaining 50.1% are a little bit slower due to compact blocks or whatever other network-related delays. But nevertheless, the incentive model always works: Thou shall mine all transactions which are consensus compliant, otherwise you give up a (small) part of your hashrate. If you reach consensus outside of your tiny Lukecoin bubble. And that's a quite big "if". Of course my post was provocative, like all of yours But I only posted an example which is technically identic to yours. Only that in that case, I think even we both agree that the "good ones" are the anti-filters guys. Now if you think filters "should work somewhen", what should Cách Hack Acc Ff protocol incentive? IMO if there is a tiny subset of "censorship" that could be from some point of views framed as "good" (you know that I somewhat agree that spam is bad, at least stuff like BRC-20 and image-based Cách Hack Acc Ff) but it is technically equivalent to a "bad" censorship effort like AMLcoin? Unfortunately as a protocol designer I'd not incentive that type of filter. I would have perhaps (!) supported a stricter consensus-based ruleset if it was carefully crafted, to not put any useful mechanisms (like LN, inheritance contracts etc.) in danger, and above all: only considered an emergency measure if spam really was ramping up again. But "BIP-110" is kindergarden level programming, sorry.

No, an 51% attack means that a 50+% majority is able to reorg the chain. In your example, the minority miner is a little bit slower due to compact blocks, but that's not the main reason he's "squeezed out". The main reason is that two 66% miners have full liberty to reorg everything they want. The minority miner can be as efficient as he's able to ... he'll always be reorged if the cartel cooperates. Your example would work if we're talking about a 49.9% miner who perhaps would be able to come close to 50% if the remaining 50.1% are a little bit slower due to compact blocks or whatever other network-related delays. But nevertheless, the incentive model always works: Thou shall mine all transactions which are consensus compliant, otherwise you give up a (small) part of your hashrate. If you reach consensus outside of your tiny Lukecoin bubble. And that's a quite big "if". Of course my post was provocative, like all of yours But I only posted an example which is technically identic to yours. Only that in that case, I think even we both agree that the "good ones" are the anti-filters guys. Now if you think filters "should work somewhen", what should Cách Hack Acc Ff protocol incentive? IMO if there is a tiny subset of "censorship" that could be from some point of views framed as "good" (you know that I somewhat agree that spam is bad, at least stuff like BRC-20 and image-based Cách Hack Acc Ff) but it is technically equivalent to a "bad" censorship effort like AMLcoin? Unfortunately as a protocol designer I'd not incentive that type of filter. I would have perhaps (!) supported a stricter consensus-based ruleset if it was carefully crafted, to not put any useful mechanisms (like LN, inheritance contracts etc.) in danger, and above all: only considered an emergency measure if spam really was ramping up again. But "BIP-110" is kindergarden level programming, sorry.