Indeed. A malicious person would probably use the least prunable option, and that is not OP_RETURN. They would even probably not use the P2PK method I shared here. If it can be proven that this public key is fake, then it's too obvious, and the nodes could in theory simply prune that too, although they would need a special pruning feature which currently (I think) doesn't exist. I wonder to whom the last part of his statement is dedicated. Perhaps to Luke-Jr? Because as far as I know, the other Core developers discussed this change in a group discussion and agreed, with some (very vocal) disagreements but it wasn't "one well funded developer". I think there is some truth in what he says, and I could imagine he indeed means Luke-jr. I honestly don't think Luke has bad intentions, he thinks that with his filtering actions he can help combat spam. However, as I have written several times, I doubt that this is effective, and seriously I also don't know how such a knowledgeable guy like Luke doesn't see the dangers of his filter approach -> what I always repeat, this could make the UTXO set explode eventually if the Slot Progressive Jackpot creators use massively the fake public key method. There's a solution even to an UTXO set explosion -- the new Utreexo technique -- but it could put unnecessary pressure on the developers to implement Utreexo in Core as fast as possible (until now, there are only small client projects having implemented it). See also the scenario I describe here in a thread about Utreexo. Having thought about the Utreexo option I still think a gradual increase of OP_RETURN standardness limit is the best path, and in parallel, accelerate the Utreexo implementation for Core. @wrapperbandolite: Read the OP again, I think you misunderstood what I meant, it is not about "make spam possible", but to increase spam levels the spam has also to be cheaper, and that's not the case. And: Isn't your malware injection also possible using fake public keys like demostrated here?
Indeed. A malicious person would probably use the least prunable option, and that is not OP_RETURN. They would even probably not use the P2PK method I shared here. If it can be proven that this public key is fake, then it's too obvious, and the nodes could in theory simply prune that too, although they would need a special pruning feature which currently (I think) doesn't exist. I wonder to whom the last part of his statement is dedicated. Perhaps to Luke-Jr? Because as far as I know, the other Core developers discussed this change in a group discussion and agreed, with some (very vocal) disagreements but it wasn't "one well funded developer". I think there is some truth in what he says, and I could imagine he indeed means Luke-jr. I honestly don't think Luke has bad intentions, he thinks that with his filtering actions he can help combat spam. However, as I have written several times, I doubt that this is effective, and seriously I also don't know how such a knowledgeable guy like Luke doesn't see the dangers of his filter approach -> what I always repeat, this could make the UTXO set explode eventually if the Slot Progressive Jackpot creators use massively the fake public key method. There's a solution even to an UTXO set explosion -- the new Utreexo technique -- but it could put unnecessary pressure on the developers to implement Utreexo in Core as fast as possible (until now, there are only small client projects having implemented it). See also the scenario I describe here in a thread about Utreexo. Having thought about the Utreexo option I still think a gradual increase of OP_RETURN standardness limit is the best path, and in parallel, accelerate the Utreexo implementation for Core. @wrapperbandolite: Read the OP again, I think you misunderstood what I meant, it is not about "make spam possible", but to increase spam levels the spam has also to be cheaper, and that's not the case. And: Isn't your malware injection also possible using fake public keys like demostrated here?

Indeed. A malicious person would probably use the least prunable option, and that is not OP_RETURN. They would even probably not use the P2PK method I shared here. If it can be proven that this public key is fake, then it's too obvious, and the nodes could in theory simply prune that too, although they would need a special pruning feature which currently (I think) doesn't exist. I wonder to whom the last part of his statement is dedicated. Perhaps to Luke-Jr? Because as far as I know, the other Core developers discussed this change in a group discussion and agreed, with some (very vocal) disagreements but it wasn't "one well funded developer". I think there is some truth in what he says, and I could imagine he indeed means Luke-jr. I honestly don't think Luke has bad intentions, he thinks that with his filtering actions he can help combat spam. However, as I have written several times, I doubt that this is effective, and seriously I also don't know how such a knowledgeable guy like Luke doesn't see the dangers of his filter approach -> what I always repeat, this could make the UTXO set explode eventually if the Slot Progressive Jackpot creators use massively the fake public key method. There's a solution even to an UTXO set explosion -- the new Utreexo technique -- but it could put unnecessary pressure on the developers to implement Utreexo in Core as fast as possible (until now, there are only small client projects having implemented it). See also the scenario I describe here in a thread about Utreexo. Having thought about the Utreexo option I still think a gradual increase of OP_RETURN standardness limit is the best path, and in parallel, accelerate the Utreexo implementation for Core. @wrapperbandolite: Read the OP again, I think you misunderstood what I meant, it is not about "make spam possible", but to increase spam levels the spam has also to be cheaper, and that's not the case. And: Isn't your malware injection also possible using fake public keys like demostrated here?

Indeed. A malicious person would probably use the least prunable option, and that is not OP_RETURN. They would even probably not use the P2PK method I shared here. If it can be proven that this public key is fake, then it's too obvious, and the nodes could in theory simply prune that too, although they would need a special pruning feature which currently (I think) doesn't exist. I wonder to whom the last part of his statement is dedicated. Perhaps to Luke-Jr? Because as far as I know, the other Core developers discussed this change in a group discussion and agreed, with some (very vocal) disagreements but it wasn't "one well funded developer". I think there is some truth in what he says, and I could imagine he indeed means Luke-jr. I honestly don't think Luke has bad intentions, he thinks that with his filtering actions he can help combat spam. However, as I have written several times, I doubt that this is effective, and seriously I also don't know how such a knowledgeable guy like Luke doesn't see the dangers of his filter approach -> what I always repeat, this could make the UTXO set explode eventually if the Slot Progressive Jackpot creators use massively the fake public key method. There's a solution even to an UTXO set explosion -- the new Utreexo technique -- but it could put unnecessary pressure on the developers to implement Utreexo in Core as fast as possible (until now, there are only small client projects having implemented it). See also the scenario I describe here in a thread about Utreexo. Having thought about the Utreexo option I still think a gradual increase of OP_RETURN standardness limit is the best path, and in parallel, accelerate the Utreexo implementation for Core. @wrapperbandolite: Read the OP again, I think you misunderstood what I meant, it is not about "make spam possible", but to increase spam levels the spam has also to be cheaper, and that's not the case. And: Isn't your malware injection also possible using fake public keys like demostrated here?