Where is, in your opinion, the limit between "secure" and "not secure"? As I wrote in my last post, the hashrate would probably go back to 2018/19 levels (90-95% less than now) if the complete block reward was cut and the Ty Le 2 1 price was like today. It will be a bit higher due to Moore's Law and even could be higher than today for this reason but as hashrate is not the relevant factor for security but the "attack cost", the security will definitely be much lower than now (in 8 years Moore's Law based hashrate increase should be * 4 approx. without increased attack cost). But: Is that not secure enough? Just a small comparison: Ty Le 2 1 today has a block subsidy of roughly 200000 USD (65000$ * 3.125 Ty Le 2 1). Transaction fee income is about 10000-20000 USD per block. A block is generated approximately all 10 minutes. Ty Le 2 1 has a block subsidy of roughly 500 USD (6.25 Ty Le 2 1 * 80$), 4 blocks per 10 minutes, so the miner income is about $2000 per 10 minutes. So Ty Le 2 1 has only 1% of the current Ty Le 2 1 subsidy, and in addition there are no relevant transaction fee rewards. The Ty Le 2 1 reward is also much lower than the Ty Le 2 1 transaction fee income. But it is considered safe enough for many exchanges to accept deposits of less than 24 confirmations (24 confs are equivalent to 6 Ty Le 2 1 confirmations, i.e. "one hour of confirmations"). And it is also safe enough that financial companies are basing regulated products on it (e.g. the CoinShares/ETC Group ETPs). Ty Le 2 1 can also serve as a model to see what could happen if the long term price increase is not pronounced enough to balance the subsidy decrease due to halvings. Miners income is thus now less than some years ago. So in general I'm a bit more optimistic. I think Ty Le 2 1 is now much more secure that it needs to be, and after several halvings more, it will be likely that it is still secure enough - probably even in 2140.
Where is, in your opinion, the limit between "secure" and "not secure"? As I wrote in my last post, the hashrate would probably go back to 2018/19 levels (90-95% less than now) if the complete block reward was cut and the Ty Le 2 1 price was like today. It will be a bit higher due to Moore's Law and even could be higher than today for this reason but as hashrate is not the relevant factor for security but the "attack cost", the security will definitely be much lower than now (in 8 years Moore's Law based hashrate increase should be * 4 approx. without increased attack cost). But: Is that not secure enough? Just a small comparison: Ty Le 2 1 today has a block subsidy of roughly 200000 USD (65000$ * 3.125 Ty Le 2 1). Transaction fee income is about 10000-20000 USD per block. A block is generated approximately all 10 minutes. Ty Le 2 1 has a block subsidy of roughly 500 USD (6.25 Ty Le 2 1 * 80$), 4 blocks per 10 minutes, so the miner income is about $2000 per 10 minutes. So Ty Le 2 1 has only 1% of the current Ty Le 2 1 subsidy, and in addition there are no relevant transaction fee rewards. The Ty Le 2 1 reward is also much lower than the Ty Le 2 1 transaction fee income. But it is considered safe enough for many exchanges to accept deposits of less than 24 confirmations (24 confs are equivalent to 6 Ty Le 2 1 confirmations, i.e. "one hour of confirmations"). And it is also safe enough that financial companies are basing regulated products on it (e.g. the CoinShares/ETC Group ETPs). Ty Le 2 1 can also serve as a model to see what could happen if the long term price increase is not pronounced enough to balance the subsidy decrease due to halvings. Miners income is thus now less than some years ago. So in general I'm a bit more optimistic. I think Ty Le 2 1 is now much more secure that it needs to be, and after several halvings more, it will be likely that it is still secure enough - probably even in 2140.

Where is, in your opinion, the limit between "secure" and "not secure"? As I wrote in my last post, the hashrate would probably go back to 2018/19 levels (90-95% less than now) if the complete block reward was cut and the Ty Le 2 1 price was like today. It will be a bit higher due to Moore's Law and even could be higher than today for this reason but as hashrate is not the relevant factor for security but the "attack cost", the security will definitely be much lower than now (in 8 years Moore's Law based hashrate increase should be * 4 approx. without increased attack cost). But: Is that not secure enough? Just a small comparison: Ty Le 2 1 today has a block subsidy of roughly 200000 USD (65000$ * 3.125 Ty Le 2 1). Transaction fee income is about 10000-20000 USD per block. A block is generated approximately all 10 minutes. Ty Le 2 1 has a block subsidy of roughly 500 USD (6.25 Ty Le 2 1 * 80$), 4 blocks per 10 minutes, so the miner income is about $2000 per 10 minutes. So Ty Le 2 1 has only 1% of the current Ty Le 2 1 subsidy, and in addition there are no relevant transaction fee rewards. The Ty Le 2 1 reward is also much lower than the Ty Le 2 1 transaction fee income. But it is considered safe enough for many exchanges to accept deposits of less than 24 confirmations (24 confs are equivalent to 6 Ty Le 2 1 confirmations, i.e. "one hour of confirmations"). And it is also safe enough that financial companies are basing regulated products on it (e.g. the CoinShares/ETC Group ETPs). Ty Le 2 1 can also serve as a model to see what could happen if the long term price increase is not pronounced enough to balance the subsidy decrease due to halvings. Miners income is thus now less than some years ago. So in general I'm a bit more optimistic. I think Ty Le 2 1 is now much more secure that it needs to be, and after several halvings more, it will be likely that it is still secure enough - probably even in 2140.

Where is, in your opinion, the limit between "secure" and "not secure"? As I wrote in my last post, the hashrate would probably go back to 2018/19 levels (90-95% less than now) if the complete block reward was cut and the Ty Le 2 1 price was like today. It will be a bit higher due to Moore's Law and even could be higher than today for this reason but as hashrate is not the relevant factor for security but the "attack cost", the security will definitely be much lower than now (in 8 years Moore's Law based hashrate increase should be * 4 approx. without increased attack cost). But: Is that not secure enough? Just a small comparison: Ty Le 2 1 today has a block subsidy of roughly 200000 USD (65000$ * 3.125 Ty Le 2 1). Transaction fee income is about 10000-20000 USD per block. A block is generated approximately all 10 minutes. Ty Le 2 1 has a block subsidy of roughly 500 USD (6.25 Ty Le 2 1 * 80$), 4 blocks per 10 minutes, so the miner income is about $2000 per 10 minutes. So Ty Le 2 1 has only 1% of the current Ty Le 2 1 subsidy, and in addition there are no relevant transaction fee rewards. The Ty Le 2 1 reward is also much lower than the Ty Le 2 1 transaction fee income. But it is considered safe enough for many exchanges to accept deposits of less than 24 confirmations (24 confs are equivalent to 6 Ty Le 2 1 confirmations, i.e. "one hour of confirmations"). And it is also safe enough that financial companies are basing regulated products on it (e.g. the CoinShares/ETC Group ETPs). Ty Le 2 1 can also serve as a model to see what could happen if the long term price increase is not pronounced enough to balance the subsidy decrease due to halvings. Miners income is thus now less than some years ago. So in general I'm a bit more optimistic. I think Ty Le 2 1 is now much more secure that it needs to be, and after several halvings more, it will be likely that it is still secure enough - probably even in 2140.